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ABSTRACT: In this study we investigate the cointegration relationship between interest rates 
and housing prices in South Africa using the autoregressive distributive (ARDL) model applied 
to quarterly data covering the post inflation targeting period of 2002:Q1 and 2016:Q4. Our 
empirical consists of splitting the empirical data into two sub-periods, one corresponding to the 
pre-crisis period (i.e. 2002:Q1 – 2008:Q2) and the other corresponding to the post-crisis periods 
(i.e. 2008:Q3 – 2016:Q4). Indeed, our empirical results confirm changing dynamics of the 
interest rate-housing price relationship in light of the financial crisis with the Reserve Bank 
appearing to respond to changes in the housing price growth in the post-crisis period. This 
results reflect the strong macropudential stance which the Reserve Bank has recently assumed 
after the sub-prime crisis and such policy stance critically depends on monitoring asset prices 
such as housing and property prices as a means of assessing market conditions. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Within the macroeconomic paradigm, research developments are commonly fostered 
by prominent crises which force economics to challenge conventional ways of thinking and 
therefore influencing the formulation of macroeconomic policies. The most recent global 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 which emulated as a crash in the US housing market has rekindled 
a lively debate on the role of monetary policy in influencing asset prices such as property prices. 
Surely the effects of the sub-prime crisis were catastrophic as the US housing market crash 
promulgated its adverse effects to the US banking sector before finally resulting in a worldwide 
financial crisis which is infamously dubbed as the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression. In terms of global impact, it has been acclaimed that the financial crisis alone is 
responsible for the loss of 34 million jobs worldwide as well as declining global economic 
growth rates from 3 percent in 2008 to 0.3 percent by the end of 2009 (Estevao and Tsounta, 
2011). 
 
The highly expansionary monetary policy stance assumed by the US Federal Reserve 
Bank under the Alan Greenspan administration in the early 2000’s, and in particularly the 
aggressive Federal Fund rate reduction following the September 11 attacks, is commonly cited 
as the key reason for the housing price bubble which burst during the financial crisis (Xu and 
Chen, 2012). Since then researchers and policymakers alike have become increasingly aware 
that monetary policies have far-reaching implications for the housing sector which tends to be 
more interest-rate sensitive than the economy as a whole and such sensitivities can vary though 
time (Wudud et. al., 2012). The main concern occupying the minds of policymakers is that a 
house price boom might be followed by a bust which would undermine bank safety and 
soundness (Shi et. al., 2014). Consequentially, through appropriate policy intervention, Central 
Banks may play a significant role in deflating a house price bubble before it erupts and 
precipitates extensive damage to the financial sector.  
 
Nevertheless, a vast majority of Central Banks worldwide tend to be overly concerned 
with the attainment of a low and stable inflation environment with the asset prices of real estate 
not being taken directly into consideration in policy formulation. This is certainly of concern 
since conventional economic theory describing or underlying the monetary transmission 
mechanism dictates that interest rates exerts both direct effects (i.e. user cost, future 
expectations and hosing supply) and indirect (i.e. wealth effects, credit-channel effects and 
balance sheet effects) on the housing sector (Mishkin (2007) and Elbourne (2008)). In turn, the 
housing market would then influence macroeconomy activity via changes in disposable income 
and consumption levels (Jiang, 2012). Hence, at the crux of modern day monetary policy debate 
is the issue of whether or not Central Banks should directly target asset prices such as housing 
prices in their policy reaction functions. 
 
Subsequent to the advent of the global financial crisis there has been a prolific empirical 
literature which has examined the effect of monetary policy on housing markets for both 
industrialized economies (Elbourne (2008), Vargas-Silva (2008), Bjornland and Jacobsen 
(2010), Gupta and Kabundi (2010), Yang et. al. (2010), Wudud et. al. (2012), Shi et. al. (2014), 
Tsai (2013), Costello et. al. (2015)) and developing or emerging countries (Gupta et. al. (2010), 
Gupta and Kasai (2011), Xu and Chen (2012)). And even with this absolute dearth of literature, 
what has certainly been ignored in the current literature thus far, is whether the global financial 
crisis affected the interest rate-housing market relationship, with the recent contribution of Tse 
et. al. (2014) serving as the sole study to do so for the UK. Indeed, the empirical results 
presented by Tse et. al. (2014) unveil a changing relationship between interest rates and the 
housing sector as caused by a structural shift owing to the global financial crisis. In our study, 
we follow in pursuit along this line of thought and investigate the possible changing 
relationship between interest rate and housing prices for the South African economy in light of 
the sub-prime crisis.   
 
We consider the South African economy as a worthwhile case study for a couple of 
reasons. Firstly, South Africa is an important emerging economy representative for a number 
of prominent blocs such as BRICS, G20, South African Development Community (SADC), 
Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC) etc. Secondly, the South 
African economy is more susceptible to external shocks, such as those transmitted from the 
global financial crisis owing to her well-developed financial system and high levels of 
openness. Thirdly, South Africa is one of the few African countries which has adopted the 
highly sophisticated inflation targeting regime as an official monetary policy framework. This 
hence renders the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) more vulnerable to aggressive interest 
rate manipulations in the interest of keeping inflation within it’s designated target. Lastly, the 
South boasts one of the most developed real estate markets on the African continent hence 
increasing the scope for which house pricing shocks propagate towards the real economy in 
comparison to other African economies.  
 
Methodologically, we rely on the autoregressive distributive (ARDL) model of Pesaran 
et. al. (2001) and we favour this econometric framework on the following accounts. Firstly, the 
ARDL mode fosters for cointegration between trend-stationary and difference-stationary time 
series, whereas other competing residual-based cointegration models such as the vector 
autoregressive (VAR) and vector error correction (VEC) models, which are widely used in the 
current literature, fail to do so. Secondly, the model performs exceptionally well even with 
small samples a feature which will prove to be particularly crucial in our analysis. Moreover, 
both the short-run and long-run coefficient estimates from the ARDL model are estimated 
simultaneously without the loss of any information. We apply the ARDL model to quarterly 
time series data collected for periods subsequent to the post-inflation target era and further 
segregate this data into two sub-sets, one corresponding to the pre-crisis periods (i.e. 2002:Q1 
– 2008:Q2) and the other corresponding to the post-crisis period (i.e. 2008:Q3 – 2016:Q4). We 
consider our choice of time framework highly appropriate since the monetary policy shift 
associated with the adoption of the inflation targeting regime renders any attempts to study the 
effects of monetary policy action with pre-2002 time series data quite futile (Phiri, 2015).  
 
Having provided a background to the study, we structure the remainder of the 
manuscript as follows. The following section of the paper provides an overview of interest rate 
movements in South Africa subsequent to the adoption of the inflation targeting regime 
framework. The third section of the paper gives an overview of interest rates movements in the 
post inflation targeting era. The econometric methodology is outlined in the fourth section 
whereas the empirical data and the empirical results are presented in the fifth section of the 
paper. The sixth section concludes the paper in the form of policy implications and 
recommendations.  
 
2 REPO RATE MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA: A POST INFLATION 
TARGETING PERSPECTIVE 
 
Since the implementation of the inflation targeting regime by the SARB in 2002, the 
repurchase or ‘repo’ rate currently serves as the Reserve Bank’s short term policy instrument 
and the monetary policy committee (MPC) has been designated the necessary authority to carry 
out all policy-related obligations (Phiri, 2017). In a nutshell, the inflation targeting framework 
stipulates that the Reserve Bank should contain CPI inflation within a width-band of 3 to 6 
percent. In the event that inflation exceeds the upper 6 percent limit, then the Central Bank 
raises the repo rate, which then causes other market rates to increase hence contracting the real 
economy which eventually lowers the inflation rate. Conversely, when the inflation rate 
breaches the lower 3 percent margin, then the Reserve Bank implements expansionary 
monetary policy by lowering the repo rate as means of stimulating the economy and hence 
increasing the inflation rate. Figure 2 below presents a time series plot pertaining to the repo 
rate movements since the adoption of the inflation targeting framework over the period 2002-
2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: Repo rate movements in the post-inflation targeting era 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (SARB) website 
 
It should be noted that the adoption of the inflation targeting regime coincides with the 
period at which the US monetary authorities drastically decreased the Federal Fund rate from 
6.1 percent in 2001 to 1 percent between 2003 and 2004 in response to the September 11 
terrorist attacks and the wave of US corporate accounting scandals. The US Federal actions 
were accompanied by a sudden burst of short-term capital flow in South Africa which resulted 
in a depreciation of the Rand as well as sharp increases in domestic and imported prices which 
were aggravated by increasing world oil prices. (Phiri, 2012). The SARB was hence forced to 
implement a series of interest rate hikes in the repo rate from 10.50 percent in the first quarter 
of 2002 to 13.50 percent in the first quarter of 2003. Following the resounding declining of 
inflation to relatively low levels, the Reserve Bank began to engage in what appears to be 
expansionary monetary policy which involved decreasing the repo rate from 13.50 percent in 
the second quarter of 2003 to 7 percent in the first quarter of 2006. However, the relaxation of 
interest rates was short lived following another episode of sharp depreciation of the local 
currency experienced from 2006 to 2009 fuelled by strong global demand and rising inflation 
rates which were transmitted through increased import prices (Phiri, 2016). In response to 
global pressures, the SARB hiked interest rates from 7.50 percent in the second quarter to 12 
percent by the end of the third quarter of 2008. 
 
Subsequent to the filling of Chapter 11 bankruptcy by the Lehman Brothers in 
September 2007 and the resulting global financial crisis of 2007-2008, the US released the 
Emergency Economic Stabilizing Act (EESA) of 2008 which permitted the Federal Reserve to 
engage in a bailout of the US financial system. This was achieved in the form of a three-stage 
quantitative easing (QE) programme which saw the Federal Reserve buy distressed financial 
assets and bonds from the banking sector as a means of lowering the yields of these assets and 
hence reducing the Federal Fund rate to its targeted ‘zero lower bound level’ (Phiri, 2016). The 
first round of the QE process implemented between November 2008 and June 2010, the sound 
round between November 2010 and June 2011 and the third between November 2012 and June 
2013. The resulting decrease of the Federal Fund rate to 0.09 percent between 2012 and 2014 
was accompanied by a corresponding drop of the repo rate from 12 percent in the third quarter 
of 2008 to 5 percent between the third quarter 2012 and the first quarter of 2014. Following the 
decision by the Federal Reserve to completely phase out the quantitative easing monetary 
policy programme in mid-2014, the Federal Reserve announced two interest rate hikes in 
December 2015 and another in December 2016. The SARB followed in close pursuit of the US 
Federal Reserve by gradually hiking up the repo rate form 5.50 percent in the second quarter 
of 2014 to 7 percent in the fourth quarter of 2016. 
 
3 AN OVERVIEW OF THE HOUSING MARKET IN SOUTH AFRICA 
BETWEEN 2002 AND 2016 
 
As previously mentioned, South Africa boasts one of the most prestigious property 
markets on the African continent with a major portion of this market being attributed to the 
housing sector. For convenience sake, the South African residential market can be categorized 
into three housing segments namely, luxury (R3.1 million to R11.5 million), middle segment 
(R430 000 to R3.1 million) and affordable (below R430 000). Nevertheless, time series data is 
only available for the middle segment which is further segregated into three size classes, 
namely, small houses (80-140 square metres), medium houses (141-220 square metres) and 
large houses (221-400 square metres). Figure 2 provides a comprehensive time series plot of 
the movement in the price growth in all three classes of housing groups and at face value, it 
can be visually observed that the growth in small house prices is more volatile in comparison 
to the growth in both medium and large houses over the entire sample period. 
 
Figure 1: Price growth of house prices for small, medium and large houses 
 
Source: Authors own plot. 
 
Interestingly enough the aggressive policy stance undertaken by the SARB in 2002, 
was accompanied by an appreciation in the house price growth experienced in all three house 
classes, even reaching 30 year record high levels by the end of 2003. Similarly, the decrease in 
the repo rate experienced from 2004 to 2006 was accompanied by a similar decrease in the 
growth of housing prices. Notably, both aforementioned time episodes contradicts 
conventional economic theory which speculates on a negative relationship between the interest 
rates and the growth in the housing sector (Mishkin, 2007). However, from 2006 to 2008, when 
the Reserve Bank raised it’s repo rate in response to inflationary pressures, the growth in 
housing prices began to drastically decline, more significantly so for small houses. Also worth 
noting are the negative growth rates in housing prices experienced during the event of the 2008-
2008 global financial crisis.  
 
Since the sub-prime crisis, the movement of the growth in housing prices has fluctuated 
unprecedentedly. For instance, between the second quarter of 2009 and the first quarter of 2010, 
the growth rate in house prices appeared to recuperate from the financial crisis as all three 
classes of house sizes recorded positive growth levels, averaging 5.28 percent for small houses, 
1.75 percent for medium houses and 1.84 percent for large house and these coincide with a 
decline in repo rate. However, in a turn of events, there were low growth rates experienced in 
housing prices between the second quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 2012, recording 
averages of -2.12 percent for small houses, 0.11 percent for medium houses and 0.19 percent 
for large houses and at this time the SARB was still engaging in expansionary monetary policy 
in the form of declining repo rates. Again this seemingly observed positive movement between 
the repo rate and house price growth contradicts conventional economic theory. Between 2012 
and 2014, the SARB kept the repo rate untampered at 5 percent resulted in a declining trend of 
growth in house prices although these growth rates never breached into negative figures with 
a 1.72 percent, 1.70 percent and 2.29 percent for small, medium and large houses respectively. 
However, flowing the repo rate hikes from 2014 to 2016, has been accompanied by declining 
performance of the growth in housing prices (i.e. averages of 1.53 percent for small houses, 
1.67 percent for medium houses and 1.13 percent for large houses), an observation which more-
or-less concurs with economic theory. 
 
4 DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
4.1 Empirical data 
 
As previously noted, the South African housing market can be formally categorized 
into luxury (R3.1 million to R11.5 million), middle segment (R430 000 to R3.1 million) and 
affordable (below R430 000). However, concerning the housing price variables as an empirical 
measure, we observe that the large-middle (i.e. 221m2 – 400m2), the medium middle (i.e. 
221m2 – 400m2) and small-middle (i.e. 221m2 – 400m2) of the middle-segment of the three 
price segments are the most commonly used time series variables due to their data availability 
(see Das et. al. (2011), Ncube and Ndou (2011) and Simo-Kengne et. al. (2013)). We follow in 
pursuit of the aforementioned authors and use these three measures of hosing prices (which 
have been renamed house1, house 2 and house3, respectively) and this housing pricing data is 
collected from the Amalgamated Bank of South Africa (ABSA) provides the seasonally 
adjusted house price index. In line with Das et. al. (2011), we convert the housing time series 
data into real house price growth by dividing the nominal house price by CPI inflation and 
converting the series into growth rates.  
 
As a measure of interest rate, we employ the SARB repo rate as an empirical measure 
and we find it the most convenient since the repo rate is the Reserve Bank’s official short-term 
policy instrument. However, since the repo data is available in daily frequencies, from the 
SARB online database, we apply interpolation techniques to convert this data into quarterly 
frequencies to ensure consistency with remaining time series variables used in the empirical 
study. Other commonly used variables employed in the interest-housing relationship as control 
variables include the inflation rate (Anari and Kolari (2002), Iacoviello (2004) and Giuliodori 
(2005)) as well as disposable income (Gallin (2006), Fraser et. al. (2012), Barrell et. al. (2015) 
and Caporale and Gil-Alana (2015)). Both these time series variables are included as control 
variables in our study and these variables are easily accessible from the SARB online database.   
 
Therefore, collectively speaking, the empirical data used in our study comprises of four 
time series, namely, the SARB repo rate (repo), ABSA housing prices (house),  CPI inflation 
rate () and disposable income (income), of which the hosing data is further segregated into 
three sub-categories namely, the large (house1), medium (house2) and small (house3) housing 
sizes. Our time series data is employed on a quarterly basis between the periods 2002:Q1 and 
2016:Q4 and is further segregated into two sub-periods, one corresponding to the pre-crisis era 
(2002:Q1 – 2008:Q2) and the other corresponding to the post-crisis era (2008:Q3 – 2016:Q4). 
 
4.2 Empirical model 
 Having presented our empirical, we proceed to specify our empirical models. We 
particularly rely on the autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) model of Pesaran et. al. (2001) 
to model the cointegration relationship between housing prices, the repo rate and inflation for 
South African data. Our baseline empirical model specifications take the following form: 
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Where 0 is the intercept term, the parameters 1, …, 4 and β1, …, β4 are the short-run 
and long-run elasticities, respectively, and et is a well-behaved error term. The first step in the 
empirical process, is to test the time series variables for their integration properties. By rule, 
the ARDL model can only be used when the time series are found to be integrated of order I(0) 
or I(1). Once it is verified that the time series are not integrated of order I(2) or higher, then 
one can proceed to test for cointegration effects among the time series. This is achieved by 
testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration (i.e. 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = 0) which is tested against 
the alternative of cointegration effects (i.e. 1 ≠ 2 ≠ 3 ≠ 4 ≠ 0).  
 
This aforementioned cointegration test is evaluated via an F-test and the critical values 
of this test are reported in Pesaran et al. (2001). The null hypothesis of no cointegration can 
only be rejected if the computed F-statistic exceeds the upper bound of the critical level 
whereas the null hypothesis cannot be rejected the F-statistics fall below the lower bound of 
the critical level. However, if the F-statistic falls between the lower and upper bounds of the 
critical levels then the cointegration test is considered inconclusive. Once cointegration effects 
are validated, then the following unrestricted error correction model (UECM) representation of 
the ARDL regression (2) can be modelled as follows: 
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𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 = 0 + ෍ 1𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝐼𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑡−𝑖 + ෍ 2𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝐼𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑡−𝑖 + ෍ 3𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝐼𝑛𝑡−𝑖 +
෍ 4𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡−𝑖 +  𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑡      (8) 
 
Where ectt-1 is the error correction term which measures the speed of adjustment of 
towards steady-state equilibrium in the face of disequilibrium. Pragmatically, the error 
correction term should be significantly negative and must be bound between 0 and -1. 
Moreover, a significant and negative error correction estimate is indicative of long-run 
causality between the time series variables. 
 
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
7.1 Unit root test results 
 
As previously mentioned, one of the major advantages of the ARDL modelling system 
is that the procedure allows for modelling of time series variables whose integration properties 
are either I(0) or I(1). Unfortunately, the modelling procedure cannot be applied to time series 
variables integrated of order I(2) or higher and hence it is imperative that the time series are 
tested for unit root properties before the variables can be estimated by the ARDL model. 
Therefore, as a first step in our empirical process, we test for the integration properties of the 
time series variables using three unit root testing procedures, namely, ADF and DF-GLS unit 
root testing procedures. The unit root tests are performed inclusive of both a drift and a trend, 
with the results of the empirical exercise are reported in Table 1 below.  
 
As can be observed from our results, we find when the ADF test is applied to the time 
series, there results are mixed. For instance, in the pre-crisis period the ADF test statistic points 
to the ‘repo’ and ‘income’ variables being I(1) variables, the ‘house1’, house2’ and ‘house3’ 
and inflation variables are all integrated of an order higher than I(1). For the post-crisis periods, 
the ADF test statistics point to the variables being I(1) with the exception of the ‘house 2’ 
variable which is observed to be levels stationary. However, when the DF-GLs test is 
performed on the variables, we find that the variables are mutually I(1) variables whilst in the 
post-crisis periods, the house1, house2 and house3 variables are I(0) whilst the remaining 
variables are I(1). Therefore, in light of this empirical evidence presented, we consider the 
results of the DF-GLS tests as being more plausible since these test are generally more powerful 
at detecting unit root tests. Hence, we conclude that none of the time series variables being 
integrated of an order higher than I(1) and proceed to apply the bounds test of cointegration 
and estimating the ARDL model in the following sub-section of the paper.  
 
Table 1: Unit root tests results 
 Time series ADF DF-GLS 
  level 1st difference level 1st difference 
 
Pre-crisis 
house1 -0.40 -1.40 -1.68 -4.79*** 
house2 -0.44 -1.55 -1.65 -4.87*** 
house3 -0.52 -1.57 -1.68 -4.83*** 
repo -2.61 -10.49*** -1.59 -5.32*** 
 -2.02 -4.89 -1.97 -5.07** 
income -2.62 -8.11*** -1.79 -4.85*** 
      
 
Post-crisis 
house1 -2.48 -4.30*** -3.57** -5.52*** 
house2 -3.15* -7.70*** -3.97*** -5.07*** 
house3 -1.15 -5.75*** -1.39 -6.67*** 
repo -2.85 -3.84** -1.98 -3.91 
 -2.62 -8.22*** -1.99 -3.56 
income -2.44 -5.77*** -2.49 -3.24 
Notes: ‘***’, ‘**’,’*’ represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
 
7.2 Cointegration tests and ARDL model estimates 
 
Having confirmed that the time series variables are combinations of I(0) and I(1) 
variables, we proceed to test for cointegration effects amongst the time series variables for the 
following ARDL regression functions which are summarized below in Table 2. 
 
  
Table 2: ARDL specifications 
dependent variable ARDL function 
 f(house1  repo, , income) 
house f(house2  repo, , income) 
 f(house3  repo, , income) 
  
 f(repo  house1, , income) 
repo f(repo  house2, , income) 
 f(repo  house3, , income) 
  
 f(  repo, house1, income) 
inflation f(  repo, house1, income) 
 f(  repo, house1, income) 
  
 f(income  repo, , house1) 
disposable income f (income  repo, , house2) 
 f (income  repo, , house3) 
 
 Note that the lag lengths of the aforementioned regression functions are selected using 
the Schwarz-Bayesian Criteria (SBC) information criterion and the regressions are performed 
for the two sample periods namely i) the pre-crisis period and ii) the post-crisis period. Further 
note that each regression is further performed using three measure of the housing prices, 
namely i) large-sized houses (house1), ii) medium-sized houses (house2) and iii) small-sized 
houses (house3). The results of the cointegration tests are reported in Table 3 below, with Panel 
A presenting the results for the pre-crisis period whereas those for the post-crisis period are 
presented in Panel B.  
 
  
Table 3: Bounds tests results for cointegration 
Panel A: Pre-crisis results Panel B: Post-crisis results 
Function form ARDL 
specification 
F-statistic Function form ARDL 
specification 
F-statistic 
      
f(house1repo, 
, income) 
(1,0,0,0) 0.84 f(house1repo, 
, income) 
(0,1,0,0) 1.52 
f(house2repo, 
, income) 
(1,0,0,0) 0.58 f(house2repo, 
, income) 
(1,0,0,0) 2.78 
f(house3repo, 
, income) 
(1,0,0,0) 1.45 f(house3repo, 
, income) 
(1,0,0,0) 3.46* 
      
f(repohouse1, 
, income) 
(1,0,0,0) 3.49* f(repohouse1, 
, income) 
(1,0,0,0) 4.93*** 
f(repohouse2, 
, income) 
(1,0,0,0) 3.56* f(repohouse2, 
, income) 
(1,0,0,0) 5.62*** 
f(repohouse3, 
, income) 
(1,0,0,0) 3.82* f(repohouse3, 
, income) 
(1,0,0,0) 4.94** 
      
f(repo, 
house1, 
income) 
(1,1,0,0) 7.33*** f(repo, 
house1, 
income) 
(1,0,1,1) 2.65 
f(repo, 
house2, 
income) 
(0,1,0,0) 1.26 f(repo, 
house2, 
income) 
(1,0,0,1) 2.31 
f(repo, 
house3, 
income) 
(0,1,0,0) 1.49 f(repo, 
house3, 
income) 
(1,0,0,1) 1.24 
      
f(incomerepo, 
, house1) 
(1,0,1,1) 4.27** f(incomerepo, 
, house1) 
(1,0,0,1) 2.81 
f(incomerepo, 
, house2) 
(1,0,0,1) 4.24** f(incomerepo, 
, house2) 
(1,0,0,1) 2.27 
f(incomerepo, 
, house3) 
(1,0,0,1) 3.65* f(incomerepo, 
, house3) 
(1,0,0,0) 2.04 
Notes: ‘***’, ‘**’,’*’ represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. P-values reported in parentheses ().  
  
When house 1, 2 and 3 are the dependent variable (i.e. f(house1  repo, , income), 
f(house2  repo, , income) and f(house3  repo, , income)), the F-statistics produced are 0.84, 
0.58 and 1.45, respectively for the pre-crisis and all these statistics are lower than the lower 
bound of the 10 percent critical level. On the other hand, the F-statistics for these same 
regression functions for the post-crisis period are 1.52, 2.78 and 3.46, respectively with only 
the last statistic being significant at a 10 percent critical level. Concerning the repo functions 
(i.e. f(repo house1, , income), f(repo house2, , income) and f(repo house3, , income)) we 
obtain F-statistics of 3.49, 3.56 and 3.82, respectively for the pre-crisis period and 4.93, 5.62 
and 4.94, respectively, for the post-crisis period. Note that all F-statistics reported for both pre 
and post crisis periods are significant at a 10 percent significance level. 
 
In turning to the inflation functions (i.e. f(  repo, house1, income), f(  repo, house2, 
income) and f(  repo, house3, income)), we obtain F-statistics of 7.33, 1.26 and 1.49, 
respectively for the pre-crisis period, of which the F-statistic for the f(  repo, house1, income) 
function being the only significant cointegration regression at a 10 percent critical level. 
Conversely, for the post-crisis period none of the F-statistics of 2.65, 2.31 and 1.24 for the 
inflation functions, respectively, are all insignificant. Lastly, for the three income functions 
(i.e. f(income  repo, , house1), f(income  repo, , house2) and f(income  repo, , house3)), 
we find highly significant F-statistics of 4.27, 4.24 and 3.65, respectively whilst for the post-
crisis period the F-statistics of 2.81, 2.27 and 2.64, respectively, are all insignificant at all 
critical levels.   
 
In summary, we find seven significant ARDL function for the post-crisis periods, 
namely i) f(repo house1, , income) ii) f(repo house2, , income) iii) f(repo house3, , 
income) iv) f(  repo, house1, income) v) f(income  repo, , house1) vi) f(income  repo, , 
house2) vii) f(income  repo, , house3), whereas we find only four significant functions for the 
post-crisis periods i.e. i) f(repo  house1, , income) ii) f(repo  house2, , income) iii) f(repo  
house3, , income) iv) f(house3  repo, , income). 
 
 
  
Table 4: ARDL estimates for pre-crisis period 
Long-run 
estimates 
repo repo repo  income income income 
        
house1 -0.03 
(0.49) 
- - 0.06 
(0.79) 
-0.29 
(0.33) 
- - 
house1(-1) - - - - 0.47 
(0.11) 
- - 
house2 - -0.02 
(0.60) 
- - - 0.17 
(0.40) 
- 
house3 -  -0.03 
(0.52) 
- - - 0.08 
(0.70) 
repo - - - 4.42 
(0.00)*** 
0.21 
(0.09)* 
0.19 
(0.18) 
0.23 
(0.16) 
repo(-1) 0.93 
(0.00)*** 
0.93 
(0.00)*** 
0.93 
(0.00)*** 
-4.07 
(0.00)*** 
- - - 
 0.14 
(0.00)*** 
0.14 
(0.00)*** 
0.14 
(0.00)*** 
- 0.12 
(0.92) 
0.03 
(0.81) 
0.01 
(0.92) 
(-1) - - - 0.28 
(0.08)* 
-0.29 
(0.02)** 
-0.26 
(0.05)* 
-0.28 
(0.05)* 
income 0.07 
(0.02)** 
0.07 
(0.04)* 
0.07 
(0.03)* 
-0.22 
(0.29) 
- - - 
income(-1) - - - - 0.58 
(0.00)*** 
0.60 
(0.00)*** 
0.63 
(0.00)*** 
Short-run 
estimates 
repo repo repo  income income income 
house1 -0.03 
(0.49) 
- - 0.06 
(0.79) 
-0.29 
(0.33) 
- - 
house2 - -0.02 
(0.60) 
- - - 0.17 
(0.40) 
- 
house3 - - -0.03 
(0.57) 
- - - 0.01 
(0.92) 
repo - - - 4.42 
(0.00)*** 
0.21 
(0.09)* 
0.19 
(0.18) 
0.23 
(0.16) 
 0.14 
(0.00)*** 
0.14 
(0.00)*** 
0.13 
(0.00)*** 
- 0.12 
(0.92) 
0.03 
(0.81) 
0.11 
(0.92) 
income 0.07 
(0.03)** 
0.07 
(0.03)** 
0.07 
(0.03)** 
-0.22 
(0.28) 
- - - 
ect(-1) -0.07 
(0.00)*** 
-0.07 
(0.00)*** 
-0.07 
(0.00)*** 
-0.72 
(0.00)*** 
-0.42 
(0.00)*** 
-0.40 
(0.00)** 
-0.37 
(0.00)*** 
Notes: ‘***’, ‘**’,’*’ represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. P-values reported in parentheses ().  
 
Based on the empirical results for the pre-crisis period reported in Table 4, we report 
the following findings. Firstly, we note that for the repo functions (i.e. f(repo house1, , 
income), f(repo house2, , income) and f(repo house3, , income)), the regression estimates 
produce negative yet insignificant coefficients on the house1 (-0.03), house2 (-0.02) and 
house3 (-0.03) variables.  This results imply that during the pre-crisis periods the SARB was 
unresponsive towards house prices and notably this result differs from conventional theory 
which hypothesizes on significant relationship between the two variables. On the other hand, 
inflation and disposable income variables both produce highly significant coefficient estimates 
of 0.14 and 0.07, respectively, across all estimated regressions. We consider this result 
encouraging since it adheres to economic theory and is further concurrent with the results 
established in the previous studies of Mitchell-Innes et. al. (2007) and Phiri and Lusanga (2011) 
for similar South African time series data. 
 
Similarly for the inflation function (i.e. f(  repo, house1, income)), we observe that an 
insignificant coefficient estimates of 0.06 and -0.22 for the housing and disposable income 
variables, respectively. Note that the later result is particularly in alignment with conventional 
growth theory and is also reiterated in the studies of Anari and Kolari (2002) and Gallin (2006), 
respectively, albeit for different economies/more advanced economies. However, for the same 
function, we are able to obtain a positive and significant coefficient of 4.42 for the repo rate 
whilst we obtain a significantly negative coefficient of -4.07 for the lag of the repo rate. This 
later results implies that inflation initially has a positive relationship with an increase in the 
repo rate which then turns negative after one quarter period. Mitchell-Innes et. al. (2007) argue 
that the changes in the repo rate as induced by the SARB take between 12 and 24 months to 
fully reflect on inflation rate. 
 
Concerning the income functions (i.e. f(income  repo, , house1), f(income  repo, , 
house2) and  f(income  repo, , house3)), we find insignificant coefficient estimates of -0.29 
for and 0.47 for the house(1) and lag of house(1) variables, respectively, whereas we obtain 
insignificant estimates of 0.17 and 0.08 for the house(2) and house(3), respectively. For the 
same income functions, the inflation variable produces insignificant estimates of 0.12, 0.03 and 
0.01, respectively, whereas the lag inflation variable produces significant estimates of -0.29, -
0.26 and -0.28, respectively. Also note that, concerning the f(income  repo, , house1) function, 
we find a positive coefficient of 0.21 for the repo variable whereas for the same variable we 
obtain insignificant coefficient estimates of 0.19 and 0.23 for the f(income  repo, , house2) 
and  f(income  repo, , house3) functions.  
 In diverting our attention to error correction estimates reported in panel B of Table 4, 
we note that the all error correction estimates produce the correct negative and significant 
estimates of -0.07 for all three housing functions, -0.72 for the repo functions and between -
0.37 and -0.42 across all three income functions. These results imply that between 7 and 42 
percent of deviations from equilibrium are corrected in each quarter and further indicates long-
run causality between the time series variables.    
 
Table 5: ARDL estimates for post-crisis period 
Long-run 
estimates 
repo repo repo house3 
     
house1 -0.09 
(0.04)* 
- - - 
house2 - 0.11 
(0.79) 
- - 
house3 - - -0.01 
(0.68) 
0.47 
(0.00)*** 
repo - - - -0.07 
(0.86) 
repo(-1) 0.80 
(0.00)*** 
0.84 
(0.00)*** 
0.84 
(0.00)*** 
- 
 0.22 
(0.00)*** 
0.16 
(0.00)*** 
0.16 
(0.00)*** 
0.21 
(0.67) 
income 0.41 
(0.04)* 
0.03 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.09)* 
-0.07 
(0.73) 
Short-run 
estimates 
repo repo repo house3 
house1 -0.09 
(0.04)* 
- - - 
house2 - 0.01 
(0.79) 
- - 
house3 - - -0.01 
(0.68) 
- 
repo - - - -0.07 
(0.68) 
 0.22 
(0.00)*** 
0.16 
(0.00)*** 
0.16 
(0.00)*** 
0.16 
(0.00)*** 
income 0.04 
(0.04)* 
0.04 
(0.09)* 
0.04 
(0.09)* 
0.04 
(0.09)* 
ect(-1) -0.20 
(0.00)*** 
-0.16 
(0.00)*** 
-0.16 
(0.00)*** 
-0.16 
(0.00)*** 
Notes: ‘***’, ‘**’,’*’ represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. P-values reported in parentheses ().  
 
In turning our attention to the post-crisis results reported in Table 5, we firstly note that 
for the repo functions, the house(1) variable produces a significant coefficient of -0.09 whereas 
the coefficients on the house(2) and house(3) produce insignificant estimates of 0.11 and -0.01, 
respectively. In making a comparison to the results obtained for the pre-crisis periods, we note 
that during the post-crisis periods the SARB has significantly responded to house price 
movements, well at least for the ‘house1’ variable (i.e. large housing).  
 
In similarity to the results obtained for the pre-crisis periods, we find inflation is 
positive and significant at all critical levels across all three repo functions, with a coefficient 
of 0.80 for f(repo house1, , income), 0.84 for both f(repo house1, , income) and f(repo 
house1, , income) functions. Pertaining to the disposable income coefficient for the repo 
functions, we obtain positive and significant estimates of 0.41 and 0.04 for the f(repo house1, 
, income) and f(repo house3, , income) functions whereas we find an insignificant estimate 
of 0.03 for the f(repo house2, , income) function. On the other hand, for the house3 function 
(i.e. f(house3  repo, , income)), we obtain insignificant parameters estimates of -0.07 for the 
repo variable, 0.21 for the inflation variable and -0.07 for the disposable income variable.  
 
Note that the error correction terms for the three repo functions are -0.30, -0.16 and -
0.16 and these estimates are significant at all critical levels. This implies that between 16 and 
30 percent of deviations from equilibrium are corrected in each quarter when a shock is induced 
through the repo rate. On the other hand, the error correction term associated with the hosue3 
function produces a highly statistically significant estimate of -0.16 which implies that 16 
percent of disequilibriums from the steady state are corrected in each period when a shock is 
induced to the hosue3 variable. Also note that these significant error correction estimates 
indicate long-run causality between the time series.  
 
5.3 Diagnostic and stability tests 
 
A battery of diagnostic tests are performed for the estimated model functions and results 
of these diagnostic tests are reported in Table 6. These tests are particularly performed for serial 
correlation, functional form, normality and heteroscedasticity and the reported test results 
indicate that all estimated regressions are devoid of residual-based misspecifications. 
Moreover, the stability tests based on the cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) and 
the cumulative sum of squares of residual (CUSUMSQ) for the seven pre-crisis estimated 
functions as plotted in Figure 3, whereas the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots for the post-crisis 
periods as plotted in Figure 4, indicate that the parameters in the each of the estimated models 
are stable at 5 percent significance level in both sample sub-periods. These diagrams are 
presented at the Appendix of the manuscript. 
 
Table 6: Diagnostic test results 
 ARDL 
specifications 
Diagnostic tests (p-value) 
  Serial correlation Function form Normality Heteroscedasticity 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-crisis period 
f(income  repo, , 
house1) 
0.80 0.63 0.89 0.20 
f(income  repo, , 
house2) 
0.78 0.61 0.89 0.22 
f(income  repo, , 
house3) 
0.40 0.33 0.60 0.30 
f(  repo, house1, 
income) 
0.20 0.18 0.32 0.37 
f(income  repo, , 
house1) 
0.13 0.34 0.69 0.13 
f(income  repo, , 
house2) 
0.47 0.50 0.76 0.19 
f(income  repo, , 
house3) 
0.66 0.19 0.69 0.60 
      
 
 
 
Post-crisis period 
f(repo  house1, , 
income) 
0.29 0.35 0.51 0.42 
f(repo  house2, , 
income) 
0.28 0.37 0.52 0.43 
f(repo  house3, , 
income) 
0.31 0.39 0.48 0.44 
f(house3  repo, , 
income). 
0.42 0.46 0.82 0.54 
 
6 CONLCUSSIONS 
 
Since the global financial crisis much academic attention has been given to the 
cointegration relationship between interest rates and the housing sector. Nonetheless, these 
previous studies tend to ignore the possibility of a changing relationship between the two 
variables as caused by a structural break attributed to the global financial crisis. In light of this 
empirical hiatus we contribute to the current literature by examining the possibility of a 
switching interest rate-housing prices relationship for South Africa, which arguably boasts the 
most prestigious housing market among all SSA countries. Because of the relative small sample 
of our quarterly empirical data as well as the mixture of I(0) and I(1) variables identified in our 
dataset, we consider the ARDL model as the most appropriate econometric framework for 
conducting our empirical analysis. Surely, our results indicate a significant changing 
relationship between interest rates and the growth in housing price with the Reserve Bank being 
more responsive to house price movements in the post crisis period. We attribute our findings 
to the macropudential framework adopted by the SARB which particularly focuses on reducing 
excessive growth in asset prices such as housing and property prices and uses these property 
prices to assess market conditions. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1: Plot to CUSUM and CUSUMSQ for pre-crisis periods 
 
Model function: f(repo house1, , income) 
  
Model function: f(repo house2, , income) 
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Model function: f(repo house3, , income) 
 
Model function: f(  repo, house1, income) 
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Model function: f(income  repo, , house2) 
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Figure 2: Plot to CUSUM and CUSUMSQ for post-crisis periods 
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Model function: f(repo house3, , income) 
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